The Afterlife of Peace Agreements by Berdal, Mats
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Berdal, M. (Accepted/In press). The Afterlife of Peace Agreements. In M. Weller, M. Retter, & A. Varga (Eds.),
Peace Agreements and International Law Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
 1 
 
[Chapter in Peace Agreements and International Law, eds. by Marc Weller, Retter, M. and Varga, A. (eds.), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2020.] 
 
 
The Afterlife of Peace Agreements 
 
 
Mats Berdal 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The chapter examines the afterlife of peace agreements aimed at ending civil wars in the 
post-Cold War era. Assessing the ‘success’ or otherwise of these agreements is not possible 
without an appreciation of the context – historical, political, cultural and normative – within 
which they have been negotiated, concluded and implemented. While context is thus all-
important, the history and fate of peace accords have also been shaped by the content of 
individual agreements, as well as by the manner of their implementation. The record shows 
that poorly designed and inadequately supported peace agreements can entrench pre-war 
patterns of conflict, exacerbate intra-elite competition, and accentuate socio-economic and 
political grievances within war-torn societies. By contrast, agreements that are properly 
designed, adequately resourced, and underpinned by constructive political support from 
parties, regional actors and international sponsors, can strengthen the political forces and 
dynamics favouring long-term stability and societal transformation towards self-sustaining 
peace. Peace agreements after civil wars are often best approached as living documents 
whose flexible and politically informed interpretation can help parties and mediators chart 
political avenues out of protracted violence. 
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Chapter 8 
The Afterlife of Peace Agreements 
 
Mats Berdal  
 
‘Peace is not a matter of prizes or trophies. It is not the product of a victory or 
command. It has no finishing line, no final deadline, no fixed definition of 
achievement.’ 
Oscar Arias, Nobel Lecture 1987 
 
1 Introduction  
From Mexico City to Dayton, Paris to Lomé, since the late 1980s the signing of peace 
agreements marking the formal end of civil wars in parts of Central and South America, the 
Balkans, Asia and Africa, have all been grand and solemn occasions, moments laden with 
hope, relief, and the promise of new beginnings. After years, sometimes decades, of war and 
social breakdown, the temptation to view such moments as decisive, culminating, end-points 
in the arduous search for ‘just and lasting’ peace has, not surprisingly, tended to be strong. 
‘The sun of peace finally shines in the heavens of Colombia’, President Juan Manual Santos 
boldly declared as he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in securing a peace 
agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) in December 2016.1 That particular agreement followed half a century of 
civil war, in the course of which more than 220,000 people were killed, tens of thousands 
disappeared and over 6 million were displaced. 
The tendency to view the signing of peace agreements as watershed moments has only been 
further reinforced by the language and the promises contained in the agreements themselves. 
Thus, the ‘comprehensive political settlement’ of the Cambodia conflict signed in Paris in 
                     
1 Juan Manuel Santos, ‘Peace in Colombia: from the Impossible to the Possible’, Nobel Lecture, Oslo, 10 
December 2016. 
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October 1991 promised ‘a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism’.2 At 
Arusha, in August 1993, some eight months before the descent into barbarism in Rwanda, the 
Rwandan government and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) solemnly ‘resolved to eradicate 
and put a definite end to all the root causes’ of the war that had started when the RPF first 
crossed into Rwanda from bases in Uganda in October 1990.3 Offering a ‘definitive 
settlement of the fratricidal war’ that had raged in Sierra Leone for much of the 1990s, the 
Lomé Peace Agreement, reached in July 1999, was no less ambitious on paper.4 In 
Guatemala, the Peace Accords signed by the government and the Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity (UNRG) in December 1996, following thirty-six years of savage civil 
war, presented ‘the country with a comprehensive agenda for overcoming the root causes of 
the conflict and laying the foundations for a new kind of development’.5  
And yet, against all this, when it comes to the afterlife of peace agreements the contrast 
between vision and reality has often been stark. The simple truth is that post-Cold War peace 
agreements following civil wars have rarely, if ever, lived up to the detailed promises 
enshrined in the agreements themselves, let alone the hopes for societal transformation and 
‘positive peace’ adumbrated at the time of their signature. This holds true even if one leaves 
aside agreements whose catastrophic collapse ushered in the resumption of large-scale 
violence – a category which, in addition to the Arusha and Lomé agreements, includes the 
Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol for Angola in 1991 and 1994 respectively, as well 
as the short-lived Abuja Agreement for Liberia of August 1995.6 In fact, in a striking number 
of cases other than these, peace agreements have been followed by an increase, rather than 
any diminution, in levels of violence and insecurity. Even where the main guns have 
remained silent for years – as in Bosnia-Herzegovina following the widespread ethno-
nationalist violence that marked the first year of the Dayton Peace Agreement – centrifugal 
forces built into the original agreement have allowed tensions to intensify over time.7 The 
extent to which the afterlife of individual peace agreements has diverged from the promise of 
                     
2 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (Paris Agreements), 23 October 
1991, Annex 5, para. 4. 
3 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) (Arusha 
Agreement), 4 August 1993. 
4 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Lomé 
Peace Agreement), 7 July 1999. 
5 Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (Guatemala), 29 December 1996. 
6 Peace Accords for Angola (Bicesse Accords), 31 May 1991; Lusaka Protocol (Angola), 15 November 1994; 
Abuja Agreement to Supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as Subsequently Clarified by the 
Accra Agreement (Liberia), 19 August 1995.  
7 General Framework Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement), 21 November 1995. 
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peace has been especially noticeable when it comes to the structural causes of conflict and 
socio-economic indicators of progress. In El Salvador and Guatemala, the peace accords of 
the 1990s have had little or no bearing on the extreme socio-economic inequities, linked to 
conflicts over land and the enduring power of economic elites, that have for so long 
characterised both societies.8 While the case of Mozambique presents a more encouraging 
picture in terms of democratic consolidation and violence reduction following the peace 
agreement reached between the government and the Mozambican National Resistance 
(RENAMO) in October 1992, the country has continued to languish near the bottom of the 
UNDP’s Human Development Index.9 This striking absence of a socio-economic peace 
dividend provides part of the background, if not the whole explanation, for the return of 
armed conflict in 2013.10  
At first sight, this divergence between promise and delivery is liable to induce cynicism and 
despair in equal measure. While both sentiments are frequently warranted, hasty and overly 
simplistic inferences from the record should nonetheless be resisted. In particular, examining 
the afterlife of peace agreements cannot be reduced to a crude ticking-off exercise in which 
peace implementation is scored or measured in some mechanical fashion against a long list of 
formally agreed objectives. To do so would be to misunderstand the functions and purposes 
of post-civil war peace agreements as well as the manner in which they are arrived at. Nor 
would such an approach help much when it comes to unpacking the relationship, direct and 
indirect, between the contents of peace agreements and the trajectory of political, military and 
socio-economic developments following their signature. To disentangle that relationship 
analytically it is necessary to examine the interplay of three elements: the contextual factors 
and political realities that help shape the agreement in the first place and which continue, in 
mutated form, to influence its implementation; the details and provisions of the peace 
agreement itself; and, finally, the decisions and choices made by parties, external actors and 
guarantors in the course of implementing the agreement. The long-term viability of any given 
peace agreement is a function of all three elements, though the relative importance of each 
has varied greatly from case to case.  
                     
8 In particular, see: Chapultepec Agreement, 16 January 1992; Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace 
(Guatemala). 
9 Mozambique came 180 out of 188 on HDI index in 2018: UNDP, ‘Mozambique: Human Development 
Indicators’: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MOZ [last accessed 30 November 2018].  
10 Alex Vines, ‘Afonso Dhlakama and RENAMO’s return to armed conflict since 2013’, in Anders Themnér 
(ed.), Warlord Democrats in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2016), 121.    
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In reflections penned not long after the end of the UN operation in Cambodia in 1993-94, 
John Sanderson, the commander of UN forces charged with implementing key aspects of the 
Paris Agreements, drew attention to the all-important connection between political context, 
peace agreement and implementation. The agreements, he stressed, ‘contained many 
compromises’, adding, rightly, ‘they would have been unlikely to gain such wide acceptance 
if they had not’.11 Crucially, however, they still ‘formed a highly credible document’.12 This 
combination of a necessarily imperfect yet still credible set of agreements carried an 
important implication, and it is one that transcends the particular case of Cambodia: an 
‘agreement is the foundation, a start point, and constant negotiation and refinement of details 
flowing from the agreement are required to bring it to fruition’.13 
2 Core Argument and Structure  
Peace agreements cannot by themselves deliver just and lasting peace. Even so, peace 
agreements clearly matter. Poorly designed and inadequately supported, they can deepen and 
entrench pre-war patterns of conflict, exacerbate intra-elite competition, accentuate both 
socio-economic and political grievances, and, ultimately, open new fissures within societies 
already torn and divided by war. By contrast, an agreement that is properly designed, 
adequately resourced, and underpinned by consistent and constructive political support from 
interested parties, regional players and international sponsors, can serve to strengthen the 
political forces and dynamics that favour long-term stability and encourage societal 
transformation towards a deeper, more truly self-sustaining, peace. The present chapter 
develops and adds nuance to this core argument by comparing and contrasting the afterlife of 
peace agreements aimed at ending civil wars in the post-Cold War era, focusing specifically 
on wars where no party has emerged victorious from the battlefield and, consequently, where 
the legitimacy of government remains contested, the state’s monopoly of violence is 
incomplete, and institutions are typically weak and fragile.14 Recognising, indeed 
emphasising, the uniqueness of individual conflict settings, the chapter focuses on issues and 
challenges that have surfaced, in one form or another, in the aftermath of all peace 
agreements, and the management of which has had a decisive bearing on the long-term 
                     
11 John M. Sanderson, ‘UNTAC: Successes and Failures’, in Hugh Smith (ed.), International Peacekeeping: 
Building on the Cambodian Experience (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994), 15, at 16-17. 
12 Ibid., 16. 
13 Ibid., 17.  
14 The agreements discussed share one further characteristic: they have all been brokered and implemented with 
some measure of UN involvement. 
 6 
 
prospects for building peace and, critically, on the quality of that peace. It proceeds in three 
parts. 
The first, in Section 3, considers contextual factors crucial to an understanding of the afterlife 
of peace agreements. It does so by reference to four, necessarily overlapping, categories: first, 
the trauma and continuing logic of civil war; second, the balance of political-military power 
on the ground and the degree of substantive clarity on the political end-state for peace; third, 
the political economy of conflict prevailing at the time of signature, that is, the informal 
pattern of influence and the distribution of power and privilege, shaped by war and conflict, 
within society and among its political-military elites; and, fourth, the global and regional 
balance of influences and pressures bearing on the conflict environment and the 
implementation of agreements.    
The second part, in Section 4, looks at the content and credibility of peace accords in relation 
to a broader, less mechanistic or literal, understanding of the functions and purposes of peace 
agreements. It concentrates on three aspects that have been at the heart of post-Civil War 
peace agreements and have proved especially important to their afterlife: provisions relating 
to ‘post-conflict’ security and the control of violence, including plans for Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
and military integration; provisions relating to the organisation and holding of elections, 
including choices made about electoral systems, timing, rules and sequencing of elections; 
and, finally, provisions relating to power-sharing, whether of a transitional or more 
permanent kind, among erstwhile enemies.  
The final section turns to the implementation of peace agreements, focusing in particular on 
the different roles played by the UN in efforts to consolidate fragile peace agreements. 
Assessing the record of the past three decades, it identifies the most significant factors to 
have strengthened the long-term viability of peace agreements. Chief among these have been 
an auspicious regional and geopolitical setting; adequate resources and enforcement capacity; 
effective Security Council support; and, above all, politically-driven, flexible and imaginative 
leadership on the part of those charged with supporting implementation.  
3 Context: Peace Agreements and Transitions from War to Peace 
The formal conclusion of peace agreements can easily give the appearance of finality to 
peace processes, especially so when protracted periods of bitter and savage violence have 
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coexisted with long-running and seemingly fruitless peace talks and mediation efforts. To 
outside observers, the length, detail and sheer scope of most peace agreements since the late 
1980s have usually added to a sense of definitiveness and rupture with the past. The 
Colombian peace agreement, to take the most striking example, runs to over 300 pages and 
covers issue-areas ranging from rural reform, political participation and gender inclusion to 
the country’s drugs problem, organised crime and the challenges of truth, justice and 
reparations posed by half a century of war.15  
The disproportionate, if understandable, attention given to the handshake moment of peace 
agreements can also, however, introduce a distorting perspective on their true significance, 
underplaying the political realities, unaddressed socio-economic grievances and 
psychological pressures that make for continuity between wartime and ‘post-conflict’ 
periods. The fractionalisation of armed groups formerly united by a common cause; the 
criminalisation of wartime networks and post-war political economies; spikes of retributive 
violence and targeted political killings; violent competition among former belligerents to fill 
security vacuums and position oneself for upcoming elections or other deadlines stipulated by 
peace agreements – these are all features that, to varying degrees, have characterised the 
afterlife of agreements. Indeed, some, if not all, of them have been notable trends during the 
first eighteen months of the Colombia Peace Agreement.16 
Peace agreements, then, rather than signalling a clean break from past patterns of conflict, are 
in reality better understood as but one phase in what is always a drawn-out, contested, 
frequently violent, and multi-layered transition from war to peace. This holds true, above all, 
for agreements aimed at ending deep-rooted conflicts of an internal character, especially 
where these have also involved identity issues of a sectarian, confessional or ethno-nationalist 
kind. Such agreements and their afterlife are all shaped by a distinctive combination of 
contextual factors. In each individual case, that combination will be given by a unique set of 
historical, political and cultural conditions from which one should be naturally wary of 
abstracting simple, universally applicable lessons. Even so, it is still possible to identify 
themes that are relevant and analytically helpful across the spectrum of otherwise diverse 
cases.  
                     
15 Final Agreement to End Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace (Colombia Peace Agreement), 
24 November 2016. 
16 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, 2 April 2018, UN Doc. 
S/2018/279, para. 88; and UN Department of Political Affairs, Opening Remarks to the Press in Bogotá, 
Colombia, Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman, 15 November 2017. 
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3.1 The Continuing Logic of Civil War 
The historical grievances and complex layers of causes that give rise to civil war, the fault-
lines which these open up within society, the dominant narratives that crystallise in the course 
of internecine conflict – none of these disappear with the formal end of hostilities. Indeed, 
appending the words ‘comprehensive’ or ‘general’ to many of the agreements reached over 
the past three decades has frequently concealed realities on the ground much better 
understood as unfinished civil wars.  
In a number of instances, this has quite literally been the case: agreements have been entered 
into because they allowed one or more parties to regroup, consolidate and live to fight 
another day. The Lusaka Protocol for Angola – in spite of considerable diplomatic and 
peacekeeping investment on the part of UN to keep the peace process on track between 1994 
and 1998 – eventually collapsed into all-out war because Jonas Savimbi never viewed the 
agreement as anything more than an opportunity to stem the tide of military defeat and, later, 
to rebuild UNITA’s military capacity. The Lomé Peace Agreement was similarly doomed 
from the outset by the absence of even a modicum of trust and commitment to the accord on 
the part of the RUF leadership.  
In other more open-ended cases, war weariness may have produced, in William Zartman’s 
oft-quoted phrase, a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, prompting belligerents to explore 
negotiations and sign up to an agreement, though even then without abandoning their core 
wartime objectives. The latter stages of the Mozambican civil war may be the best example, 
though it is also one of the very few, where a combination of factors resulted in a truly 
hurting stalemate. These included the devastating effects of a prolonged draught, the 
withdrawal of external patronage, and the very limited natural resource base available to the 
warring parties for continuing to prosecute the war. A mixture of exhaustion, internal division 
and external pressure may thus result in parties wanting an agreement but, even then, ‘only to 
the extent that they [are] able to exploit it’.17  
Now, in all these cases, the underlying tensions and sources of instability that characterise the 
early afterlife of peace agreements are intimately connected to the context of civil war itself. 
Because civil wars involve issues of power and belonging, raising fundamental questions 
about the legitimacy and location of governmental authority, they tend to generate violence 
                     
17 Michael Doyle and Nishkala Suntharalingam, ‘The UN in Cambodia: Lessons for Complex Peacekeeping’ 
(1994) 1(2) International Peacekeeping 117, at 129. 
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that is intimate, widespread and, all too often, marked by atrocities and exceptional brutality, 
leaving behind ‘deep wounds in individuals, in families and in society as a whole’.18 By 
politicising markers of identity, weakening peacetime norms of social behaviour and 
habituating societies to violence, civil wars are uniquely polarising and profoundly disruptive 
in their effects on the social fabric of society and the ties of solidarity and trust that hold 
communities together. In Bill Kissane’s evocate phrase, civil wars leave ‘nations torn 
asunder’.19 So while peace agreements may bring an end to large-scale fighting, former 
belligerents remain bitter adversaries in its aftermath, and war-affected populations continue 
to be afflicted by the lived experience and traumas of war. Without a clear victor, the zero-
sum logic of civil war continues to operate and mistrust among communities is likely to 
remain strong, persisting long after the signing of a peace accord.  
The extent to which civil war produces these effects naturally varies across cases. Even so, 
the general context of civil war means there is always an in-built tension at the heart of peace 
agreements. On the one hand, they rely on the good faith and commitment of the parties for 
implementation. To a degree, this is necessary or they would not have been signed up to in 
the first place. On the other hand, in the wake of intrastate conflict, trust is precisely the 
quality most likely to be in short supply. In such circumstances, basing implementation 
entirely on good faith and assumptions of compliance can, and has had, fateful consequences. 
As Margaret Anstee, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Angola 
from 1992 to 1993, observed: ‘the thesis that the main responsibility for implementing the 
[Bicesse] Accords must be vested in the two parties to the conflict presupposed a Boy Scout’s 
code of honour in circumstances hardly conduce to the evolution of the Boy Scout spirit’.20 
As the history of the Lusaka Protocol and the subsequent trajectory of the Angolan conflict 
suggest, the Bicesse Accord suffered multiple weaknesses and giving the UN a more central 
role in implementation may not have been enough to save it.  
And yet, while peace agreements plainly cannot conjure up trust and commitment ex nihilo, 
the record suggests that the content of peace agreements, their interpretation and 
implementation, can serve either to undercut, or, conversely, reinforce a continuing logic of 
civil war. In Mozambique, an imaginative and flexible interpretation of the Rome Agreement 
                     
18 Commission for Historical Clarification, ‘Guatemala: Memory of Silence’, Report of the Commission for 
Historical Clarification, 1999, para. 150.  
19 Bill Kissane, Nations Torn Asunder: The Challenge of Civil War (Oxford: OUP, 2016). 
20 Margaret Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 
1992-3 (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 532-533.  
 10 
 
by the UN mission leadership allowed for trust to be generated among the parties and for 
RENAMO to enter the political process.21 By contrast, the Dayton Peace Accord, as David 
Harland has damningly commented, represented not only an exclusive ‘elite deal between the 
same three ethno-national elites that had started the war’, it also saddled Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
with constitutional provisions that ‘have prevented the emergence of moderate and pragmatic 
political forces’.22 The result, in this and other cases, has been that the traumas and logic of 
civil war have been allowed to weigh more heavily on the afterlife of peace agreements than 
might otherwise have been the case, limiting the scope for progress in other areas, notably 
political integration, reconciliation and economic development.23 
All of these cases raise complex questions and difficult judgements about inclusion of parties 
in peace agreements and the role of third parties in fostering confidence, issues discussed 
more fully below.  
3.2 The Political Context and Foundations for Peace 
‘Transitions from war to peace’, Astri Suhrke reminds us, ‘raise basic issues about access to 
political power in post-war society’.24 ‘These are inherently conflictual and contested 
questions, particularly so in societies emerging from violent strife fought over the legitimacy 
or control of the state’.25 It follows that the underlying stability of any given peace agreement 
hinges, in large part, on the degree to which fundamental issues of access to power and 
questions of political end-state have been substantively addressed in the accord. In practice, 
this has varied from situations of greater or lesser clarity to situations of profound ambiguity. 
In the latter case, agreements have proved highly unstable and, frequently, short-lived. Thus, 
following NATO’s military campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 
June 1999, UNSC Resolution 1244 gave effect to the Rambouillet Accords and reaffirmed 
‘the call for … substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo’.26 
Fundamental disagreements over the meaning of ‘substantial autonomy’ and the final status 
of Kosovo, however, helps to account for the fraught and rocky road to its unilateral 
                     
21 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique (Rome Agreement), 4 October 1992. 
22 David Harland, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina Case Study’, Stabilisation Unit, Elite Bargains and Political Deals 
Project, February 2018, at 3: www.sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/publications/elite-bargains-and-political-
deals/1567-case-study-bosnia-herzegovina/file [last accessed 30 November 2018].  
23 Christopher Bennett, Bosnia’s Paralysed Peace (London: Hurst & Co., 2016). 
24 Astri Suhrke, ‘The Peace in Between’, in Astri Suhrke and Mats Berdal (eds.), The Peace in Between: Post-
War Violence and Peacebuilding (London: Routledge, 2012), 1, at 18. 
25 Ibid. 
26 UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999), 10 June 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1244(1999), 2; Interim Agreement for Peace 
and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Accords), 23 February 1999.  
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declaration of independence in 2008, notwithstanding a large and intrusive international 
civilian and military presence with executive powers on the ground in the years after 1999. 
Surveying the period since the late 1980s, it is clear that the length, detail and textual 
intricacies of an agreement do not provide a reliable indicator of the underlying strength of its 
political foundations, nor do they act as a guarantee against instability and breakdown. In 
point of fact, both the length and detail of agreements have often concealed an underlying 
absence of substantive agreement on a political end state. Where this has been the case, issue 
areas left vague have become battlegrounds during implementation. Jean-Marie Guehénno, 
head of UN peacekeeping from 2000 to 2008, observed of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement for Sudan, signed in January 2005,27 how ‘detailed institutional provisions 
coexisted with great vagueness on some key issues that were at the heart of the conflict’.28 
The Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006, signed by the Sudanese government and the 
largest rebel group in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), was also remarkably 
comprehensive in scope, incorporating complex provisions relating to security, wealth-
sharing and power-sharing.29 In Guehénno’s view, however, it was ‘much too elaborate, with 
its many details hiding a lack of genuine agreement on end goal’.30 By contrast, the Erdut 
Agreement between Croatia and local Croatian Serb authorities in Eastern Slavonia reached 
in November 1995, was both short and shorn of high-flown language.31 It established the UN 
Operation in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), which oversaw the transfer of Eastern Slavonia 
from Croat Serb to Croatian government control between 1996 and 1998. Its comparative 
success owed largely to the fact that the political end-state was never in doubt: Croatia was 
reasserting full sovereignty within an agreed period over territory controlled by the Krajina 
Serbs since 1992. Although usually held out as a success story, the peaceful transfer of 
control should not be confused with a just settlement for former, notably Croat Serb, 
inhabitants of the province who witnessed ‘widespread intimidation, violence and 
                     
27 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/SPLA, 9 January 2005. 
28 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 2015), 171.  
29 Darfur Peace Agreement, 5 May 2006. For a thoughtful assessment see: Laurie Nathan, ‘No Ownership, No 
Peace: The Darfur Peace Agreement’, Crisis States Research Centre (LSE), Working Paper No. 5, 20 September 
2006: http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-
two/wp5.2-darfur-peace-agreement.pdf [last accessed 1 December 2018]. 
30 Guéhenno, ‘Fog of Peace’, 187.  
31 Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Erdut Agreement), 12 
November 1995. 
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discrimination’ during the transition period,32 ensuring that many of them either left or never 
returned.  
As these examples indicate, the relative strength or weakness of the political foundations of 
an agreement is closely connected to the balance of political-military forces on the ground, 
and the capacity of parties to sabotage an agreement. Both of these, in turn, are inextricably 
linked to the wider question of political economy.  
3.3 Peace Agreements and the Political Economy of War-to-Peace Transitions  
Post-Cold War peace agreements following civil wars have all contained, in one form or 
another, provisions aimed at shoring up the authority, reach and legitimacy of the state. To 
this end, peace agreements have unlocked funds and resources for capacity and institution 
building, geared, in particular, towards reforming the coercive apparatus of the state: its 
armed forces, the police and security sector broadly conceived. At the same time, alongside 
efforts aimed at strengthening formal institutions, peace agreements have sought to change 
the rules of the game governing politics, typically by introducing democratic elections, 
power-sharing arrangements, and, in some cases, enshrining far reaching constitutional 
reforms.  
Building institutions, however, never starts from scratch, nor do the workings of new rules 
play out in a power vacuum. This is especially so in cases where civil war and state weakness 
have transformed social, economic and political bases of power within society, resulting in 
the emergence of alternative political and economic orders where effective power has shifted 
to informal networks of privilege and patronage of a violent and exploitative kind, usually 
connected to region-wide war economies.33 In these circumstances, formal rules and 
institutions, however central to a peace agreement, matter less to post-agreement stability 
than the underlying political economy and power dynamics shaped by war and armed 
conflict.34 Crucially, such political economies – rooted in distinctive war economies the 
workings of which are concealed behind the shell or façade of formal institutions – persist 
beyond the signing of peace accords. Forged in wartime, war economies and informal 
                     
32 International Crisis Group, ‘Breaking the Logjam: Refugee Returns to Croatia’, ICG Balkans Report No.49, 9 
November 1998, at 2-9: www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/croatia/breaking-logjam-refugee-
returns-croatia [last accessed 1 December 2018]. 
33 Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum (eds.), Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power After Peace (London: 
Routledge, 2012), 2-14. 
34 As Ladley and Wennmann put it, ‘the key to political economy analysis is the attempt to map and explain the 
real contours of power’: Chapter 21 by Andrew Ladley and Achim Wennmann in this volume, [x]. 
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networks have proved highly resilient and explain why peace agreements – as with the 
grandly entitled ‘Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition’ reached in late 2002 and 
meant to bring the Second Congo War to an end – have often been followed by a ‘violent 
peace’.35  
How, more specifically, do considerations of political economy bear on the afterlife of peace 
agreements? Powerbrokers and informal actors strengthened by conflict are uniquely placed 
to subvert and undermine capacity-building provisions enshrined in peace agreements, as 
well as to manipulate electoral and power-sharing arrangements to serve their own predatory 
and illiberal aims.36 This challenge has been especially acute in the immediate aftermath of 
inconclusive conflict when the power of wartime actors is still considerable and the price of 
challenging them is likely to involve violent resistance. In practice, many peace agreements 
have recognised these realities by giving political-military elites and powerbrokers a 
privileged role in peace accords, granting them access to formal power and, in several cases, 
amnesties from crimes committed in wartime.37 Doing so has sometimes reflected an 
exaggerated belief in the transformative impact of having reached a peace agreement in the 
first place, underpinned, especially in 1990s, by a naïve belief in the transferability of 
Western liberal structures to war-torn settings. In many cases, however, the decision to 
engage with existing power structures has been based on the judgement that the risks and 
enforcement costs associated with confronting them were too high and that few other options 
were available. Such a judgement is likely, not unreasonably, to have reflected the fact that 
wartime elites, however troubling and unsavoury their record in other respects, will often 
enjoy a high degree of local legitimacy deriving from their role in providing security and 
other public goods to communities in lieu of a properly functioning state. The risks involved 
in thus accepting the ‘realities of power’ are nonetheless very real: doing so may entrench 
wartime power structures and political-military elites with a vested interest in continuing 
instability. The Lomé Peace Agreement provides the most notorious and controversial case of 
an amnesty aimed at securing buy-in of parties to a peace agreement, with an ‘absolute and 
free pardon’ granted not only to Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, but ‘to all combatants and 
                     
35 Kris Berwouts, Congo’s Violent Peace (London: Zed Books, 2016), 103-104.  
36 For the relationship between rising levels of electoral violence and underlying power structures in many sub-
Saharan states between 1920 and 2010, see: Mimmi Søderberg Kovacs and Jesper Bjarnesen (eds.), Violence in 
African Elections: Between Democracy and Big Man Politics (London: Zed Books, 2018). 
37 For the use of amnesties in peace settlements in 1990s, see Chapter 26 by Reneé Jeffery in this volume. 
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collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives’. 38 
Unsurprisingly, the agreement began to unravel within months.39 
For all that war economies have proved resilient, it is still the case that peace agreements can 
be designed, and their implementation approached, in ways that either reward predatory 
actors and strengthen illicit political economies, or, conversely, provides incentives for 
peaceable behaviour. Crucial in this respect are the decisions made with regard elections and 
power-sharing, though there are few aspects of a peace agreement that are unaffected by 
considerations of political economy. Where, for example, criminal and overtly economic 
agendas have become major drivers of conflict, as in Colombia, alternative livelihood 
strategies and properly resourced reintegration programmes for ex-combatants provided for 
in a peace agreement may be vital to preventing renewed violence in the long-run.40 
There is a final point here. It concerns the longer-term relationship between a peace 
agreement and the structural or ‘root’ sources of conflict. For it is clear that some peace 
agreements have come to enshrine, or, more accurately, have served to reassert, pre-war and 
historically rooted political economies that contributed to exclusion, marginalisation and 
violent conflict in the first place. This kind of outcome may be inevitable in cases where civil 
war has ended in a compromise peace but where political and socio-economic elites have 
been able to retain power and influence, resulting in instances of ‘elite capture’.41 While such 
peace agreements may still produce valuable and important gains (notably by reducing overt 
political violence), failure to tackle underlying political economies is likely to have 
displacements effects in the form of increased levels of social and criminal violence, all the 
                     
38 Lomé Peace Agreement, Article IX.  
39  UNSC, First Report of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 6 December 1999, UN Doc. 
S/1999/1223, paras. 34-35.  
40 Recognizing this, the Colombia Peace Agreement includes ‘significant innovations to deal with criminal 
agendas’: John de Boer et al., ‘Criminal agendas and peace negotiations – the case of Colombia’, UN University 
Centre for Policy Research, Crime-Conflict Nexus Series: No. 6, April 2017, at 8: 
https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2484/Criminal-Agendas-and-Peace-Negotiations-The-Case-of-
Colombia.pdf [last accessed 1 December 2018]. For the provisions relating to the ‘reincorporation of FARC-EP 
into civilian life’ and measures to address the ‘illicit drugs problem’, see chapters 3 and 4 of the peace 
agreement. 
41 Christine Cheng et al., ‘Synthesis Paper’, Stabilisation Unit, Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project, June 
2018, at 41: www.sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/publications/elite-bargains-and-political-deals/1586-synthesis-
paper/file [last accessed 1 December 2018]. 
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while leaving structural grievances unaddressed. These points are perhaps nowhere better 
illustrated than by the examples of El Salvador and Guatemala.42  
3.4 External Influences Bearing on Peace Agreements 
Just as civil wars are never wholly internal, be it in terms of their origins, dynamics or 
international consequences, so peace agreements and their afterlife must be understood in 
their geopolitical and regional context. When the period since the late 1980s is viewed as a 
whole, the impact of geopolitical and regional influences on the afterlife of agreements can 
be said to range along a spectrum from benign and constructive at one end, to profoundly 
destabilising at the other. 
At the positive end, potentially fragile peace agreements have been shored up by proactive 
political and diplomatic support, including a willingness to offer inducements and exert 
pressure at key moments during implementation, by external actors, notably the UN Security 
Council but also ‘groups of friends’ and influential donors. The key to success in these cases 
has been basic agreement among external actors on the political end-state for an agreement, 
followed up with concrete steps to galvanise diplomatic support, mobilise resources and 
encourage regional actors to play a constructive role during implementation. Examples 
include the support given and pressures applied during the implementation of the Namibian 
settlement plan in 1989, the Paris Agreements for Cambodia in 1992-1993, and the General 
Peace Agreement for Mozambique in 1992-1994. In all three cases both Council and donor 
support remained strong and did not fracture.43 
This has not, however, proved to be the norm. More often than not international engagement 
has been more half-hearted, reflecting a lack of strategic interest, limited staying-power and 
insufficient recognition of the need for political follow-up on the part of major powers and 
neighbouring states once agreements have been concluded. ‘The real nail in the Angola 
coffin’, Anstee concluded, ‘was that the solution of the conflict never enjoyed high priority 
on the agenda of the countries that mattered’.44 And in Rwanda in 1993, a ‘paltry 
                     
42 Sebastian Elgueta, ‘Guatemala Case Study’, Stabilisation Unit, Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project, 
February 2018, at 25-28: www.sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/publications/elite-bargains-and-political-deals/1571-
case-study-guatemala/file [last accessed 1 December 2018]. 
43 UNSC, Final Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Mozambique, 23 December 1994, UN 
Doc. S/1994/1449, para. 35; Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace (London: MacMillan, 1997), 474. 
For the role of the UN in crafting and supporting peace agreements through the instrumentality of peace-making 
and peacekeeping, see Chapter 13 by Scott Sheeran and Catherine Kent in this volume. 
44 Anstee, ‘Orphan of the Cold War’, 535-536. 
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international effort gave further ammunition to opponents of the peace agreement’.45 In Sierra 
Leone, the already flawed Lomé Agreement was further compromised by President 
Obasanjo’s decision to withdraw Nigerian peacekeeping troops from the country and the 
manifest unwillingness of traditional troop-contributors and Council members to fill the 
vacuum following Nigeria’s departure.46   
Even more damaging than neglect and indifference have been those situations where outside 
powers have actively sought to sabotage a peace agreement, or, more indirectly, where 
profound instability in a neighbouring state, or the wider region, have impeded 
implementation of an agreement. In these cases, building stable foundations for peace has 
often proved impossible. Although the fate of the Lomé Peace Agreement was shaped by 
extreme reluctance on the part of major powers to support the process, more important still 
was the hostile regional context. As Mitton makes clear, it was only with ‘the removal of 
[Charles] Taylor from power in 2003, [that] Liberia ceased to be a source … of instability in 
the region. Without a third party such as Taylor providing finance, backing and intermediary 
mobilisers for war, conflict within Sierra Leone [became] practically difficult.’47 In the DRC, 
attempts before and after the ‘Global and Inclusive Agreement’ to end violence in the east of 
the country have persistently been undermined by the actions of, and militias sponsored by, 
Rwanda, Uganda and other countries in the region. And, increasingly, state fragility and 
mounting instability in Venezuela are undermining efforts to implement key parts of the 
peace agreement reached in neighbouring Colombia in 2016.48  
4 Content: The Credibility of Peace Agreements  
4.1 The Functions and Purposes of Peace Agreements 
The achievements of any given peace agreement cannot meaningfully be assessed solely 
against the yardstick of formally stated objectives and grandiose promises made at the time of 
its signature. For one, as Alvaro de Soto, distinguished mediator and chief architect of the 
                     
45 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, ‘Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda’, in Stephen J. Stedman et al. 
(eds.), Ending Civil Wars: the Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 463, 
at 493.  
46 Sierra Leone – Next Steps’, Note from Annabi to Riza, 26 August 1999; ‘Sierra Leone – SRSG Adeniji’s 
Visit to Washington’, Note from Miyet (DPKO), 30 November 1999.  
47 Kieran Mitton, ‘Sierra Leone Case Study’, Stabilisation Unit, Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project, 
February 2018, at 17: www.sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/publications/elite-bargains-and-political-deals/1580-
case-study-sierra-leone/file [last accessed 1 December 2018]. 
48 Olin Wethinghton, ‘Venezuela’s Collapse Threatens Colombia’s Hard-Won Stability’, Foreign Policy, 1 
October 2018: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/01/venezuelas-collapse-threatens-colombias-hard-won-
stability/ [last accessed 1 December 2018]. 
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1992 peace agreement for El Salvador, has noted, there are ‘portions of agreements that are 
not meant to be implemented’.49 Seemingly a cynical perspective, de Soto’s observation 
merely acknowledges an important truth: negotiated agreements aimed at ending civil wars 
all contain language, compromises and technical shortcomings that reflect the constraints 
given by historical context and political realities. 
While context is thus all-important, the detailed provisions of individual agreements still 
matter. Agreements reached over the past three decades show that content can make for 
weak, inherently unstable or, in extremis, unworkable documents. These are agreements 
whose provisions, and the strategic choices they embody, have provided incentives for 
continued violence of a political, retributive or criminal kind; that have restricted political 
space to spoilers and power-brokers who see functional utility in continued instability; that 
have predicated implementation on a wholly unrealistic level of resources and enforcement 
capacity; and, more generally, that have helped entrench forces intent upon blocking 
processes of societal transformation needed for the scars of war to heal. By contrast, a strong 
or more credible agreement can counteract these tendencies, helping instead to mitigate the 
centrifugal forces that make for renewed war, while empowering more progressive political 
actors and processes. 
What, then, are the functions and purposes of peace agreements? Against what kind of 
qualitative criteria should their effectiveness be evaluated? The post-Cold War history of 
efforts to smooth transitions from civil war to peace point to three broad contributions for 
peace agreements in the process:  
• Peace agreements can help control and reduce levels of violence and insecurity by 
weakening structural incentives for resorting to violence as a means of resolving 
political differences and/or advancing criminal and economic agendas. In part, this 
can be encouraged through concrete steps: disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), military integration, the creation 
of monitoring mechanisms and the rebuilding of law and order institutions. Equally if 
not more important, however, are the steps taken to ensure that the new political space 
and ‘rules of the game’ created by a peace agreement encourage rather than 
                     
49 Alvaro de Soto, ‘Dear Young Mediator’, in Rachel Gasser et al. (eds.), Letters to a Young Mediator (Basel: 
Swiss Peace Foundation, 2015), 54.  
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undermine the growth of moderate and progressive political forces and dynamics in 
favour of long-term stability. 
• Peace agreements can provide mechanisms for conflict resolution, including fixes and 
face-saving formulas for overcoming seemingly intractable obstacles to progress. A 
good example is provided by the creation of the Supreme National Council (SNC) in 
the Paris Agreements for Cambodia.50 Composed of all four factions to the conflict, 
including the Khmer Rouge, the SNC was presented as the embodiment of national 
sovereignty. In fact, it was a largely symbolic devise designed to make an agreement 
possible. It was also a fiction because, though it appeared to address the problem of 
power-sharing, it did not challenge the underlying power-dynamics and the 
dominance of Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).  
• Peace agreements can help build confidence in the future and provide the beginnings 
of societal change of a deeper and more transformative kind. The function of an 
agreement in this sense may be less about resolving outstanding issues than 
‘identifying and cultivating common interests’ and exploring the ‘possibility of 
cooperation and coexistence’.51 
The content of peace agreements can support these purposes in direct and indirect ways, and, 
ideally, every aspect of an agreement should work towards them. In practice, three core areas 
have proved especially important: provisions aimed controlling and reducing violence and 
insecurity; provisions relating to the organisation and holding of ‘post-conflict’ elections; 
and, finally, arrangements made for power-sharing between former adversaries.  
4.2 Post-War Security  
Where parties to an agreement have emerged weakened yet undefeated from civil war, the 
long-term prospects for that agreement will depend, above all, on the extent to which a secure 
environment is established early on in the life of the agreement. Failure to bring civil war 
violence under control invariably breeds fear and uncertainty about the future among 
ordinary citizens, stifles socio-economic recovery, hampers reconciliation, and, crucially, 
undermines trust in the ability of institutions and new rules of the game to deliver public 
goods and usher in an era of peaceful politics. As faith in the prospects for the rule of law 
diminishes and the legitimacy of governing structures seeps away, violence becomes more 
                     
50 Paris Agreements, Section III. 
51 Avi Shlaim, ‘Ehud Barak and the Palestinian Track’, London Review of Books, 21 January 2001.  
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deeply entrenched, spreads and diversifies into other forms, from opportunistic and organised 
crime to vigilantism, self-policing, and various forms of ‘popular justice’.  
The coercive capacities of state and non-state parties to a peace agreement at the time of 
signature pose the most direct potential source of post-agreement insecurity. Those capacities 
include regular rank-and-file military formations that have yet to be demobilised as well as 
personnel technically discharged but still awaiting meaningful socio-economic reintegration. 
More important in terms of immediate post-agreement stability, however, have tended to be 
the structures and personnel subsumed under the loose and all-encompassing category of 
‘security sector’, ranging from self-defence groups and paramilitary forces, special militias, 
customs bodies and border guards, to correctional services, police units and intelligence 
organisations of various kinds. Their importance to the afterlife of agreements derives from 
the power and privileged position acquired in wartime, when their ranks will have swollen 
and their economic and political influence grown. As examples from Guatemala, Bosnia, 
Afghanistan, Colombia, and the DRC also show, members of the security sector frequently 
become deeply intertwined with organised crime in ‘post-conflict’ states.52 
All of this helps explain why – in order to ‘minimise the risks of a return to warfare, stabilize 
the security situation and build confidence among Parties’53 – DDR and SSR programmes 
have formed such a central part of contemporary peace agreements. In addition to downsizing 
regular formations, amalgamating formerly opposing armies, and reintegrating demobilised 
soldiers into sustainable civilian livelihoods, SSR initiatives have sought to rebuild law and 
order institutions by seeking to professionalise and de-politicise personnel, as well as by 
introducing oversight mechanisms and promoting ‘democratic governance’ of security 
institutions. 
Now, in view of the criteria set out above, the ‘success’ of DDR and SSR programmes is 
most meaningfully measured, not primarily by numerical targets or technical benchmarks 
met, but by the degree to which they have contributed towards greater political stability and 
control of violence during war-to-peace transitions, i.e. the latter does not automatically flow 
                     
52 James Cockayne, Hidden Power – The Strategic Logic of Organised Crime (New York, NY: OUP, 2016), 12-
14; Edgar Gutierrez, ‘Guatemala Elites and Organised Crime’, InSight Crime, 1 September 2016, at 15: 
www.insightcrime.org/investigations/guatemala-elites-and-organized-crime-series/ [last accessed on 2 
December 2018]. 
53 Paris Agreements, Article V(1), Annex II. 
 20 
 
from the former.54 On this score, the record of achievement is decidedly mixed. There are 
two aspects to explaining that record. The first relates to what might be termed the mechanics 
of delivery: that is, how to overcome challenges involved in planning, organising, 
coordinating and funding what have proved to be major technical and logistical tests. The 
second aspect concerns the degree to which the implementation of DDR/SSR programmes – 
including, crucially, decisions about what to prioritise, ignore or fudge – has proceeded from 
an understanding of political context and the need to anchor such programmes within 
political processes aimed at reducing violence, building confidence and consolidating peace.  
Efforts to downsize and restructure unaccountable, frequently corrupt, bloated and heavily 
politicised military establishments, and law and order institutions, have posed formidable 
practical challenges. Poor coordination among donors, agencies and regional organisations; 
limited resources and severe logistical challenges, as well as inadequate follow-up in dealing 
with entrenched security sector actors, especially the police, have all been identified as the 
Achilles heel of peace agreements. According to Sanderson, the Paris Agreements ‘would 
have been much stronger if arrangements for the control of police forces had been more 
clearly defined’.55 And, in the view of William Stanley, more substantive police and justice 
reform in Guatemala ‘might have helped prevent the descent into mass criminality and near 
state failure that occurred over the next decade’.56 In Angola, Sierra Leone and DRC, the 
mismatch between the DDR and SSR ambitions of agreements and the logistical, financial 
and organisational resources mustered to meet those ambitions have proved even more 
glaring.  
Partly because of these experiences, both the UN and donors have made a concerted effort to 
develop technical expertise, harness new technologies, improve inter-agency coordination, 
consolidate funding and, in particular, develop ‘principles and standards’ to underpin DDR 
and SSR activities.57 As a result, strides have undoubtedly been made in overcoming the 
supply side challenges raised by the design and implementation of multi-donor and multi-
                     
54 In the literature on DDR and SSR, including the ‘guidance’ notes emanating from the UN Secretariat, a sharp 
distinction is usually made between DDR and SSR. While there are technical, even analytical, reasons for doing 
so, my principal concern here is with the overall effect of both DDR and SSR on security, stability and violence 
in the early afterlife of peace agreements.    
55 Sanderson, ‘UNTAC: Successes and Failures’, 19. 
56 William Stanley, Enabling Peace in Guatemala: The Story of MINUGUA (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2013), 49. 
57 See UN SSR Task Force, Security Sector Reform: Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, 2016; and the work 
of the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, bringing together no fewer than 22 UN entities to develop 
agreement on: UN, Integrated DDR Standards, 2006: www.unddr.org/iddrs.aspx [last accessed on 2 December 
2018]. 
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agency DDR/SSR programmes. Even so, as the difficulties involved in the reintegration of 
former members of the FARC-EP in Colombia have shown, the practical challenges remain 
formidable.58 The example of Colombia, however, also serves to highlight the second and, 
ultimately, more critical determinant of success in DDR and SRR.  
For all the work that has gone into improving the delivery of programmes, there is a 
deceptively tidy and overly technocratic quality to much of the prescriptive and technical 
writings generated by NGOs, government and UN agencies aimed at improving DDR and 
SSR programmes. That tidiness has also tended to be a characteristic of DDR/SSR as 
conceived in peace agreements where, typically, a sequential approach to taskings – i.e. 
disarmament, followed by demobilisation followed by reintegration – is stipulated, and 
violence is understood as ‘essentially a technocratic … law-and-order problem linked to 
weak state institutions’.59 Zoë Marriage, writing in 2007 about demobilisation efforts then 
underway in the DRC, accurately captured the approach, but also the sense of unreality, that 
have characterised many DDR/SSR programmes enshrined in peace agreements: 
‘demobilisation was conceptualised in the Lusaka Agreement and the Pretoria Accords … as 
a static problem: there was a caseload of combatants to be demobilised. … The language of 
the agreements themselves … is of logistical and technical challenges, described in terms of 
numbers to be demobilised and the allocation of tasks.’60 The point here is not that practical 
challenges do not require attention. Rather, it is this: if the implementation of DDR and, even 
more so, SSR programmes have indeed become a key ‘point of vulnerability in transitions 
from war to peace’61, this is not primarily because of the scale of the practical challenges 
involved; it is because they occur in dynamic conflict settings, where governmental authority 
and legitimacy are contested, monopoly of force is partial and institutions are weak. In such 
circumstances, tackling violence and insecurity emanating from disgruntled ex-combatants 
and the security sector is only partly, and never principally, a question of resources, donor-
coordination and suchlike. Indeed, the tendency to focus on these has diverted attention away 
from the political dynamics at the root of post-agreement violence and the political economy 
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within which DDR/SSR initiatives are inescapably embedded.62 Where programmes have 
proceeded in ignorance of this, they have acquired, strikingly so in the DRC, a shambolic 
quality that has only helped to fuel instability. 
It flows from all of this that the DDR and SSR provisions of a peace agreement require a 
flexible interpretation, if necessary flouting unrealistic short-term goals and setting aside 
rigid timetables. Prioritisation and sequencing must be part of a wider political process, 
premised on the recognition that there is no inherent or automatic relationship between 
DDR/SSR programming and the resolution of conflict.  
4.3 ‘Post-Conflict’ Elections 
The view that ‘elections are key for fostering peace and stability in transitional settings’63 is – 
at least as a general proposition – still widely held, even though it is now rarely advanced 
with the liberal-democratic naivety and blind optimism of the early post-Cold War era. The 
idea that early elections can have a conflict-mitigating impact on the afterlife of peace 
agreements rests on a combination of arguments. Chief among these is that democratic 
elections confer crucial domestic and international legitimacy on fragile post-war governing 
structures. By enabling wider participation from across society, elections can also serve to 
open up political space and encourage the growth of non-violent politics. Last, but not least, 
elections can play an important symbolic and psychological role, marking the arrival, in the 
eyes of war weary citizens and the wider international community, of a ‘new a political order 
centred on rule-based competition for office rather than open warfare’.64  
While there is, certainly in the abstract, merit to each of these arguments, the consequences of 
introducing electoral competition into fractured, war-torn and divided societies have, more 
often than not, been to exacerbate rather than mitigate conflicts, in some instances with 
catastrophic consequences. As Brad Roth notes, ‘while electoral accountability is an 
important component of peaceful and stable governance, electoral designs that neglect local 
peculiarities can produce results that serve neither peace nor democracy.’65 This has proved 
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to be the case especially in countries with little or no history of electoral politics involving 
broad-based and institutionalised political parties; parties that is, committed to transcending 
societal divisions, ascriptive ties and narrow sectional interests. The destabilising 
consequences of electoral competition in these circumstances are not confined to the first 
electoral cycle after war’s end, though it is plainly of particular importance and has received 
much attention as a result. In Burundi, the 2015 elections and their profoundly polarising 
political effects have, it is now clear, dealt a fatal blow to the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement (APRA) of August 2000 – an agreement that had brought Huti and 
Tutsi elites together in a delicate power-sharing pact to end twelve years of civil war.66 The 
ICG, reporting on the eve of the 2015 elections, noted how ‘far from being consensual, the 
electoral process has become an arena of confrontation that has created a pre-electoral 
climate even worse than in 2010’.67 The political outcome of the election, which saw the re-
election of President Pierre Nkurunziza in violation of the agreement on limiting the 
presidential term to two terms, has been to turn a ‘crisis into low intensity armed struggle’ 
between the government and the opposition, reviving and dramatically sharpening ethnic 
tensions.68 The case of Burundi fits a pattern of rising levels of electoral violence in Sub-
Saharan Africa that coincides, paradoxically, with the spread of formal democratic elections 
and practices on the continent since the end of the Cold War.69  
The precise impact of ‘post-conflict’ elections on the afterlife of peace agreements is closely 
linked to the political and strategic consequences that flow from three key choices.  
The first relates to the timing of elections, specifically the question of how early to hold them 
after the formal end of hostilities. The record leaves no doubt that holding elections too soon 
after war’s end risks the collapse of peace agreements and return to violence.70 The second 
choice concerns the sequencing of elections, that is, the order in which local, regional and 
national elections are held, with some taking the view (though empirical evidence is 
inconclusive and there is little consensus on the issue) that holding local before nationwide 
elections may usefully serve to ‘inculcate voters in the rights and responsibilities of 
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democracy’.71 The third and, arguably, most critical issue concerns the kind of electoral 
system chosen – critical because they ‘shape the behavioural incentives for campaigning 
politicians, [and] the relative payoffs for resorting to national versus sectarian appeals’.72 
Cross-national studies of electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2010 
strongly suggest that ‘electoral institutions are important for shaping the incentives for 
governments and opposition alike to engage in electoral violence.’73 Specifically, Fjelde and 
Höglund have persuasively linked ‘the use of violent electoral tactics to the high electoral 
stakes that are put in place by majoritarian electoral institutions, such as plurality rules and 
small electoral districts.’74 It is also clear that centralised presidential systems carry a 
particularly high risk of generating violence and instability in ‘post-conflict’ settings, tending 
as they do to concentrate powers of patronage in a chief executive at the centre. Burundi is 
only one of several cases where attempts to change or ignore presidential term limits have 
served to reignite violence. As Guehénno concluded from his experience: ‘the direct election 
of the president, which was pushed by the international community in Congo as in 
Afghanistan, was a strategic choice fraught with risks’.75 The potentially divisive effects of 
choices made regarding timing, sequencing and electoral system are also well illustrated by 
the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Dayton Peace Agreement required elections to be 
held within 6 to 9 months on the basis of a electoral system that reinforced the importance of 
ethnicity and ‘encouraged zero-sum competition between representatives of the three 
parties’.76  
The Dayton elections were held in the mid-1990s and there is now much greater recognition 
in the academic literature as well as among practitioners engaged in electoral programming 
that choices relating to timing and electoral systems have strategic consequences, and that 
precautionary measures can help reduce risks of electoral violence. Brancati and Snyder, for 
example, have shown that while early post-civil war elections carry inherent risks, these can 
be ‘mitigated’ by ‘favourable conditions’, including ‘demobilisation, peacekeeping, power-
sharing, and the development of robust political, administrative and judicial institutions’.77 
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Fjelde and Höglund also found that systems of proportional representation ‘and a greater 
number of legislative seats per electoral district significantly reduce the risk that actors will 
engage in violent electoral strategies’.78  
And yet there remains something inherently paradoxical about resorting to competitive 
electoral processes as a means of building trust and resolving conflict in the aftermath of 
inconclusive civil wars, especially when outcomes are defined in ‘winner-takes-all’ terms. 
Notwithstanding the degree of learning that has taken place, contextual factors discussed 
above ensure that electoral processes invariably become ‘arenas for confrontation’. In part, 
this is linked to the continuing logic of civil war at work in ‘post-conflict’ settings. Equally, if 
not more important, however, is the political economy prevailing at the time of signature, and 
its often perverse impact on democratic processes and their outcome. For one, where political 
and economic power is channelled through informal networks and personal connections, the 
scope for fraud and manipulation is great, a reality that helps explain why attempts by 
outsiders, however well intentioned, to engineer desired ‘political outcomes’ have such a 
poor record. The deeper problem here is succinctly summarised by Goodhand, Suhrke, and 
Bose in their penetrating analysis of the 2014 parliamentary election in Afghanistan. In 
comments whose relevance extend well beyond the Afghan case, they note:  
Where, as in Afghanistan, competition in the economic and political spheres is 
structured, indeed over-determined by the legacies of war, gaining office through 
elections depends to a considerable extent upon access to the means of violence and 
patronage. Paradoxically, then, elections tend to further embed at the heart of 
government the patronage networks of politico-military groups. Rather than 
disrupting corruption, elections run the risk of further institutionalising it.79 
For all this, the pressures to hold elections after conflict and to make them part and parcel of 
peace agreements have endured, even though elections themselves may no longer be crudely 
‘idealised as arenas in which conflicts are resolved’.80 One source of that persistence, of 
course, is the fact that elections have provided a convenient exit mechanism for external 
actors involved in peace-building. What the record clearly suggests is that the centrality given 
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to elections in peace agreements, whether it is done for principled or more pragmatic reasons, 
should be downplayed, while complementary ways of channelling political activism and 
participation through mechanisms other than competitive electoral politics should be 
encouraged.  
4.4 Power-Sharing and the Dilemmas of Inclusion  
As with the argument that democratic elections can help solidify peace agreements, the view 
that power-sharing arrangements among former enemies can serve, in effect, as conflict-
mitigating mechanisms built into agreements, is not without a compelling logic of its own. To 
be sure, where parties have not been comprehensively defeated and retain the capacity to 
obstruct an agreement, power-sharing in some form may be inevitable.81 Power-sharing 
arrangements may, as noted, serve to counter the divisive effects of elections, and may also 
be a precondition for progress in other areas, as with the case of the SNC in the Paris 
Agreements for Cambodia. More positively, by encouraging and entrenching habits of 
cooperation and compromise, the very experience of power-sharing can be transformative 
and confidence-building.82 In this view, enforced proximity and close personal interaction 
can break down enemy images and stereotypes, helping to forge new human relationships 
built around a commitment to solve common post-war challenges.83  
However, as with the experience of early democratic elections, power-sharing arrangements 
have not necessarily proved a source of post-conflict stability. In fact, in a number of cases 
the power-sharing formulae chosen and the principles governing inclusion and exclusion in a 
peace agreement have produced perverse incentives, leading to a sharpening of violent 
competition among powerbrokers. Drawing specifically on African conflicts and power-
sharing deals struck in the first decade and a half following the Cold War, Denis Tull and 
Andreas Mehler have pointed to the ‘hidden costs of power-sharing’ motivated solely by 
short-term considerations, that is, solely by the desire to reduce overt levels of violence 
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without also seeking to establish a viable political framework for lasting peace.84 The Lomé 
and Abuja agreements provide striking examples precisely of situations where power-sharing 
‘for the sake of peace’ in the short run created powerful incentives for continued violence.85  
Among the cases on which Tull and Mehler based their findings were also the international, 
regional and inter-Congolese attempts to bring the Second Congo War to an end. And, 
indeed, the eventual result of those efforts – the ‘Global and Inclusive Agreement’ signed in 
Pretoria in 2002 – offers a telling insight into the perils and potentially destabilising 
consequences of ill-conceived power-sharing formulas. The Pretoria Agreement set out the 
modalities – crucially over power-sharing and the integration of armed forces – that would 
govern a three-year transitional period through to multiparty elections in 2006.86 In the end, 
eleven parties signed the agreement, of which six had armed forces of their own. Although 
thus an inclusive agreement, the concept of power-sharing underlying it had the perverse 
effect of encouraging violence as a means of acquiring political influence. As Judith 
Verweijen explains: ‘since influence at the negotiation table — and later in the transitional 
government — was in part a function of military strength, and because using or threatening 
violence proved a valuable political asset, the transition entrenched the political 
instrumentalisation of violence’.87 The complete failure to create a new and properly 
integrated Congolese army, as envisaged under the agreement, compounded and reinforced 
the destabilising dynamic of power-sharing during the transition. 88  
In this particular case, power-sharing was envisaged for a transitional period and motivated in 
part by the urgent and understandable desire to reduce horrific levels of violence in eastern 
DRC, even though its logic combined with the failure of SSR to undercut that very aim. 
Power-sharing arrangements of a more permanent kind, enshrined in provisions that stipulate 
constitutional reform as an integral part of the peace accord, can also, however, have the 
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effect of magnifying and entrenching the salience of wartime divisions.89 This is one of the 
chief criticisms levelled against the Dayton Accord. As one early and detailed legal analysis 
of the accord put it: the Dayton framework ‘confirms the existence of the state yet contains 
the ingredients that divide it into separate political and legal entities. … [It] fortifies the 
tripartite division of nation, community and individual in the new Bosnia where ethnic 
identity is all, and the body politic is a fractured soul.’90 
One clearly needs to be careful about generalising across different cases: decisions regarding 
appropriate power-sharing formulas are highly contingent on contextual factors, both internal 
and external to the conflict in question. Even so, two more general observations regarding the 
role of power-sharing in peace agreements can still be extracted from the overall record. 
First, while the proposition that agreements should be as inclusive as possible is widely 
accepted and, indeed, has acquired a mantra-like quality, actual decisions about who to 
include in, or exclude from, power-sharing after inconclusive civil wars invariably raise 
complex and, frequently, morally fraught policy dilemmas and trade-offs. There are several 
aspects to this. In the first place, although seasoned mediators are right in principle to stress 
that ‘peace is made between enemies’91, there will be circumstances – as suggested by Lomé 
and Abuja – where bringing predatory actors into the fold runs the risk of torpedoing rather 
than consolidating peace. Furthermore, even where actors are genuinely committed to peace, 
inclusion in and of itself does not guarantee post-agreement stability, let alone long-term 
societal change. The peace accords for Guatemala, as William Stanley has shown in his 
thoughtful analysis of the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), were the 
result of extensive consultations with civil society groups, producing, in the end, an agenda 
that ‘accurately captured the range of things that needed to change for Guatemala to become 
a more functional, stable, and just society’.92 However, as he also makes clear, ‘efforts to 
build a consensus agenda through dialogue took place of direct negotiations involving people 
with actual power’.93 And the ‘downside’ to such a ‘consensus-building approach’ was that 
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‘the resulting accords lacked substance, depth, and political feasibility’.94 None of this, it 
should be stressed, is to deny the central importance of the principle of inclusion as a means 
of widening participation and creating long-term stakeholders in peace.95 The point, rather, is 
that the application of the principle needs, in the interest of post-agreement stability, to take 
account of the likely impact of power-sharing arrangements on incentive structures and 
political dynamics among parties to an agreement.  
Second, and in spite of what has just been said, short-term decisions and power-sharing 
arrangements aimed at bringing a halt to large-scale fighting, especially when taken without 
regard to possible second and third order consequences, will always carry the risk of longer-
term instabilities, even a reversion to outright war. This, of course, is much easier to see with 
the benefit of hindsight than it is at the time when judgements have to be made about the 
viability of agreements. It suggests again, however, that peace agreements should not be set 
in stone and that flexibility and review mechanisms should be built into them.96 It also points 
to the critical importance of the implementation phase of peace agreements.    
5 Implementation: Shaping the Afterlife of Peace Agreements  
The cases examined in this chapter have all involved varying degrees of external support for 
the implementation of peace agreements. The quality of that support, unsurprisingly, has 
influenced their afterlife. Leadership and flexibility in interpreting the content of agreements 
can help shore up tenuous compromises and build confidence among key constituencies for 
peace. Conversely, a rigid and uncompromising approach to text and to the execution of 
plans – sticking slavishly, say, to self-imposed deadlines in defiance of political and logistical 
realities on the ground – is certain to exacerbate underlying fragilities. The record also makes 
clear, however, that the scope for leadership to have a positive impact is itself linked to two 
additional factors. The first of these relate to the resources and enforcement capacity 
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available to assist implementation. The second and, on balance, more important factor is the 
degree of continuous and constructive political backing, especially from the Security Council 
but also from regional bodies and ‘groups of friends’, extended to those charged with 
implementation.   
5.1 Resources and enforcement capacity  
Financial and military resources provided by external actors – including bilateral and 
multilateral donor support, military and peacekeeping forces – cannot compensate for 
inherently unworkable peace agreements or situations where parties are fundamentally 
resistant to making agreements work (as the efforts that went into shoring up the Lusaka 
process between 1994 and 1998 illustrate). There are enough examples, however, to show 
that in cases other than these, economic resources and enforcement capacity wielded by 
outsiders can strengthen vulnerable agreements by providing psychological reassurance and 
security guarantees to vulnerable populations; offering deterrence against would-be spoilers; 
and providing much-needed material assistance to implement the more resource-intensive 
aspects of an accord.  
For all the limitations of the APRA in Burundi, Peter Uvin and Leanne Bayer concluded that 
the ‘efforts of the international community in managing the establishment of a new security 
framework … were pivotal for turning the commitments in the APRA into practice’.97 These 
efforts included the deployment of nearly 6,000 peacekeepers tasked, inter alia, with DDR 
and the provision of electoral support, and also saw the head of the UN mission chair the 
Implementation Monitoring Committee for the APRA.98 By contrast, the 1993 Arusha 
Agreement for Rwanda, was notable among other things for the fact that ‘mediators and 
parties … staked its implementation almost exclusively on international actors who were 
unwilling and unprepared to expend resources to meet its provisions’.99 
Even when enforcement capacities are provided, however, the readiness to employ them 
flexibly in response to threats to an agreement, as distinct from their theoretical availability, 
is the ultimate determinant of their utility. The peacekeeping mission deployed in support of 
the Lomé Accord had an authorised strength of 17,500, yet was initially paralysed by 
capability gaps, disunity of command and a basic unwillingness on the part of the UN 
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mission leadership to act proactively to shore up the agreement.100 An even more striking 
example is provided by the early afterlife of the Dayton Agreement, where a 60,000-strong 
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed and properly mandated to assist 
implementation yet remained distinctly passive throughout what proved to a violent first year 
of peace in Bosnia.  
What these and other examples show is that lack of resources and/or unwillingness to employ 
them can have deeply debilitating effects on on-going peace processes. What is also clear, 
however, is that there is no simple or automatic relationship between the available resources, 
or size of an external footprint, on the one hand, and success in stabilising post-war 
environments on the other. For example, the relative success of UK-led stabilisation activities 
in Sierra Leone between 2002 and 2012 is clearly linked to the continued commitment of 
outside support in the form of funding and training for Sierra Leone’s armed forces and 
security sector.101 The scale of that support, however, was comparatively modest. Here, as in 
other cases, the strength of parallel political processes proved all-important. 
5.2 International Political Support  
Even in cases where resources and technical support are limited or slow in materialising, 
active political support and unanimous backing from the Security Council for peace 
implementation missions can influence the balance of incentives in favour of peace among 
parties. This is a key lesson from the UN’s involvement in both Mozambique and Cambodia 
in the early 1990s.  
In the former case, a pivotal aspect of the Council’s support for the UN Operation in 
Mozambique (ONOMUZ) was the trust it placed in the SRSG, Aldo Ajello, reflected in its 
‘flexible and pragmatic’ attitude towards slippage in the timetable, which in turn allowed him 
to ‘induce greater cooperation by using the threat of deadlines and the prospect of withdrawal 
of the UN operation’.102 The effect of Council unity was to leave no room for the parties to 
play member states off against each other. Ajello himself stressed the value of having three of 
the permanent members of the Council – the UK, France and the US – involved throughout 
the entire peace process, first as observers during the Rome negotiations and then as 
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international members of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) responsible for 
implementing the Rome Agreement.  
A similar mechanism was in place in Cambodia through a grouping known as the Extended 
Permanent Five (EP5), set up in Phonm Penh after the signing of Paris Agreements and 
including, in addition to the ambassadors from the P5, representatives from Australia, 
Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Indonesia, Japan and Thailand. The EP5, which supported 
UNTAC throughout the entire mandate period, effectively ‘served to remind the Cambodian 
parties of their obligations under the Paris Agreements during the five months between their 
signing and the establishment of UNTAC, as the parties, and some countries, sought to 
exploit the new dynamics created by the agreements’.103 Significantly, the EP5 mirrored a 
‘core group’ of ambassadors in New York and close contact between these ‘ensured 
coordination between the operational and strategic levels through the policy process in the 
capitals’.104 As a result, Council resolutions on Cambodia, ‘drafted in the face of major 
obstacles as the mission progressed, were achievable and reflected the realities on the 
ground’.105  
In both these cases, the level of Council involvement and interest dropped markedly with the 
formal end of the UN mission. This reduction in the intensity of external engagement 
following the implementation phase has, not only in Mozambique and Cambodia but 
elsewhere, prevented gains from being consolidated and increased the risks of backsliding. 
As Marrack Goulding concluded from UNTAC experience, ‘it’s not enough just to negotiate 
a peace treaty, go in with a peacekeeping operation to implement the peace treaty, and then 
withdraw your involvement’.106 This view, emphasising the need for involvement beyond the 
formal termination of a UN deployment, including in particular the maintenance of a close 
watching brief by the Council, has been a recurring theme in the lessons-learned literature. It 
needs to be added, however, that such engagement has often been strongly resisted by the 
states subject to external assistance themselves, as they have sought to reassert their 
credentials as sovereign states and reduce their dependence on an outside and politically 
intrusive implementing force. With regard to Cambodia, it was Boutros-Ghali’s own view 
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that ‘growing unease about the extent to which the Security Council’s mandate had caused 
the UN to intrude into the country’s domestic affairs’ meant ‘there was no way the UN could 
stay’.107  
More often than not, however, sustaining high-level diplomatic interest and securing political 
commitments from major powers in support of peace agreements, have proved major 
challenges in their own right, especially so after the initial, largely Western, enthusiasm for 
the liberal internationalism came to be tempered by experiences of peacekeeping in Somalia, 
Haiti, former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It is evident, for example, that meaningful and 
substantive progress in ending continuing violence and insecurity in eastern parts of DRC 
after the ‘Global and Inclusive Agreement’ of 2002, would have required deeper and far more 
sustained ‘strategic engagement in the politics of Congo’ by the Security Council.108  
5.3 Political Leadership and Flexibility in Interpreting Agreements  
For reasons already discussed, peace agreements aimed at ending civil wars have all 
contained ambiguities, omissions and technical shortcomings. This very fact, however, has 
also left room for creative interpretation of provisions and strategic interventions in the 
course of implementation, specifically with regard to the prioritisation, timing and 
sequencing of tasks and objectives set out in an agreement. Where agreements have involved 
a central role for the UN, political leadership exercised by the UN mission has, on occasion, 
played a vital role in keeping fragile processes afloat during the early stages of 
implementation.109 The ability thus to influence events on the ground has proved greatest in 
situations where the UN has been given an executive role in bodies and commissions set up to 
oversee implementation, as was the case in Mozambique where the UN was not a mere 
observer, but ‘the locomotive moving the entire process forward’.110 By contrast, the Bicesse 
Accord for Angola provided for no such executive role, leaving instead the onus of 
responsibility for implementation entirely to the parties. Even with less intrusive or robust 
mandates, however, as Alvaro de Soto notes of the UN mission in El Salvador set up to verify 
the implementation of agreements between the government and the FLMN, it has still been 
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possible to ‘exert pressure [on the parties] through shame, cajoling, and persuasion’.111 Even 
with a strictly limited mandate, the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) ‘got 
very far using these tactics’.112  
These considerations all hint at the potential importance of political leadership and strategic 
direction exercised by the SRSG at the helm of a UN mission during the early afterlife of a 
peace agreement. Reflecting on the success of the UN operation in Namibia in 1989, Marrack 
Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs at the time, emphasised the 
value of ‘a good [and] a well-negotiated settlement’ but, equally, the importance of the kind 
of ‘very professional, and imaginative leadership’ provided by Marti Ahtisarri and Cedric 
Thornberry on the ground.113 Indeed, according to Jean Krasno, Athisarri ‘struggled almost 
on a daily basis to keep the threat of violence below a level that would have derailed the 
process’.114 Likewise, in El Salvador, continuing third-party mediation by ONUSAL was one 
aspect of the ‘major role’ played by the UN ‘in assisting Salvadorans in implementing the 
provisions of their accord’.115  
A particularly instructive example of the potential for third party political leadership 
exercised in support of an agreement was provided by ONUMOZ under Aldo Ajello. What 
precisely was his role and what does it tell us more generally about the possibilities for 
constructive facilitation of peace agreements by outside actors? Three factors merit special 
attention.  
In the first place, Ajello chose to interpret the mandate flexibly, viewing it as a floor rather 
than a ceiling, making the best possible use of limited resources and deftly navigating the 
politics of the UN secretariat, key members of which disliked his penchant for improvisation 
and evident reluctance to abide by the UN rule-book. For example, it very soon became clear 
that the timetable for accomplishing mandated tasks – including DDR and the organisation of 
legislative and presidential elections within the space of one year – was wildly unrealistic. 
Ajello, who would later describe the timetable as ‘the most negative element of the entire 
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peace agreement’,116 insisted on and secured a more flexible and politically driven schedule 
of implementation.  
Second, he skilfully utilised the asset of Security Council support and unity. A key aspect of 
this, as noted, was the creation of what was in effect a ‘shadow Security Council in 
Maputo’.117 This allowed a ‘united front’ not only vis-à-vis the parties but also to the Security 
Council proper, and was used ‘to “engineer” the engagement of the Council at key junctures 
in the process and to elicit decisions from it that supported the SRSG’s strategy’.118 
Third, and most importantly in terms of wider lessons, Ajello’s main contribution involved a 
key political judgment on his part regarding the UN’s priority objective in Mozambique 
following sixteen years of brutal civil war. That objective was to ensure that RENAMO 
remained committed to the peace process, something which, in the first instance, involved 
bringing its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, to Maputo, and, secondly, ensuring that RENAMO 
itself was transformed from a guerrilla movement into a functioning political party. In 
pursuing this objective, Ajello recognized, crucially, that ‘Dhlakama was no Savimbi’119, 
meaning, among other things, that while he had demonstrated great capacity for cruelty in the 
course of the civil war, he was not, as Anstee observed of Savimbi, ‘hell-bent on achieving 
power at any cost and by any means’.120   
For all this, one should be careful about inferring too much about the agency of the SRSG 
from the case of Mozambique. With the perspective of nearly twenty-five years and other 
case studies with which to compare ONUMOZ’s record, it is obvious that Ajello and his team 
benefited from some critical enabling conditions, most of which have been noticeably absent 
elsewhere. One of these was that the parties to the Rome Agreement were ‘extremely 
susceptible to external pressure’, a function in part of being heavily dependent on foreign 
aid.121 Crucially important was also the fact that active support from the Council and key 
donors remained steadfast throughout, including, in particular, from Italy whose ambassador 
to Mozambique ‘repeatedly found essential money for things auditors would not approve of, 
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but that were crucial to keeping the peace’.122 The ability to draw on resources and improvise 
in this fashion in support of an agreement has proved very difficult to reproduce elsewhere. 
Last, but certainly not least, the parties themselves were basically committed to the peace 
agreement. As the Secretary-General himself put it, key to the success of the mission was ‘the 
political pragmatism shown by the parties to the General Peace Agreement’.123  
There is one further consideration arising from implementation of the Rome Agreement that 
is of wider relevance. Although the Mozambican civil war saw countless instances of mass 
atrocity crimes, the peace agreement made no provision either for a legal war crimes process 
to be held or for a truth and reconciliation mechanism to be set up. The UN’s dealings with 
RENAMO and the Government on the ground were thus made possible by the existence of an 
effective amnesty, and Ajello himself considered that essential to the success of the peace 
process.124 Both normative and legal developments since the early 1990s have made it much 
more difficult to grant unqualified or blanket amnesties as part of a peace processes.125 
While ONUMOZ may have enjoyed distinct advantages, there are other examples of 
initiatives taken by mission leaderships locally that have helped to counter potentially 
divisive aspects of a peace accord. One of these was the decision, conceived of and 
implemented by UN staff in Bosnia in 1998, to replace vehicle licence plates indicating the 
entity from which a vehicle hailed with a common licence plate for the whole of the country. 
Until this step was taken, politicised and unreformed local police forces had been able to 
determine the ethnicity of occupants of vehicles travelling throughout the country, with 
predictable consequences. According to Martin Barber, Deputy SRSG in the UN Mission in 
Bosnia from 1996 to 1998, ‘extortion and harassment, beatings and arrest awaited drivers of 
vehicles carrying the ‘wrong’ plates for the town they were entering’.126 The effect on the 
freedom of movement of introducing a common licence plate was immediate, with ‘volumes 
                     
122 Dirk Salomons, ‘Probing the Successful Application of Leverage in Support of Mozambique’s Quest for 
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of traffic between the different entities and communities [increasing] by 50 per cent within 
one month of the full implementation of the new plates’.127  
5.4 International Support for Peace Agreements: Trends and Prospects 
As the discussion above makes clear, the instances where the international community 
through the UN has played a genuinely constructive role in support of peace agreements are 
nearly all confined to the early post-Cold War period. Even then, many agreements suffered 
from broken promises, lack of external support and half-hearted political follow-up. It was 
nonetheless a period, it is now clear, distinguished by a comparatively high and consistent 
level of harmony among major powers, underpinned by general commitment to the tenets of 
liberal interventionism on the part of key Council members. Indeed, for much of the 1990s it 
was commonplace to speak of the P3, meaning the US, UK and France, as the dominant 
influence on Council proceedings and outcomes (a function in part of the relative weakness 
and domestic preoccupations of Russia and China at the time). These were the powers whose 
policies and interests, in the final analysis, determined the character and extent of UN 
involvement in peace and security, including the amount and quality of support given to the 
implementation of ambitious peace agreements. This geopolitical context has since changed 
dramatically, with divisions among the P5, especially between Western Council members and 
Russia, having steadily deepened and now increasingly affecting all aspects of Council 
politics.128 Plainly, this change in context – which in recent years has been reinforced by a 
resurgence of nationalist and populist sentiment and a preference for ‘transactional deal-
making’ in countries, most notably the US, that formerly were more unequivocally 
committed to multilateralism and values-driven diplomacy – raises long-term questions about 
the role of the Security Council in support of post-Civil War peace agreements.  
6 Concluding Reflections 
There is no simple or easy way of benchmarking success when it comes to analysing peace 
agreements and their afterlife. Indeed, discussing, let alone defining, ‘success’ in any 
meaningful sense is impossible without an appreciation of the wider context – historical, 
political, cultural and normative – within which a given agreement was negotiated, concluded 
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and implemented. Ascribing post-signature developments to flaws inherent in the peace 
agreement may be unfair where implementation is undermined by an unfavourable and 
hostile regional setting from the outset; where it is crippled by limited resources; and, most 
important of all, where it is up against a fundamental lack of commitment on the part of key 
powerbrokers and signatories to the agreement.  
Nor are there any fixed or ready answers to questions about the appropriate length, level of 
detail, and degree of inclusivity of an agreement. Again, meaningful answers to such 
questions depend critically on context. In some cases, as Charles Call concluded of El 
Salvador, ‘the unusually high level of detail in the agreements proved much more help than 
hindrance in the implementation process’.129 By contrast, Guéhenno has written of the Darfur 
Peace Agreement that its ‘cease-fire provisions were absurdly unrealistic in their level of 
complexity, combining excessive detail with critical ambiguities’.130 As for the role of 
outsiders, there will always be limits to what they can do in terms of securing a lasting 
settlement. Although close UN involvement in implementation has on occasion proved 
helpful in stabilising agreements, it is also true that even where the UN has been entrusted with 
very extensive powers, this has not necessarily translated into effective control and influence. In 
Cambodia, UNTAC was never able to control key government ministries as envisaged under the 
Paris Agreements, nor was it able to create a ‘neutral political environment’ before the elections 
in 1993. Overall, as these and other cases covered suggest, peace agreements after civil wars 
are best approached as living documents whose flexible interpretation can help parties and 
mediators chart political avenues out of violence. 
In the end, authoritative and less provisional judgements about the contribution of peace 
agreements to building lasting peace after civil wars require a longer-term historical 
perspective, formed in response to a broader set of questions. Did the peace agreement in 
question mark an inflexion point in the country’s political history? Did it allow for new habits 
of peaceful politics to develop and become entrenched in its political culture? Did it provide 
the basis for processes of societal transformation to begin? Did it challenge underlying 
political economies of structural conflict whose effect historically had been to encourage civil 
war recidivism? As the agreements covered in the present chapter, spanning a period of more 
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than a quarter of a century, make clear, even those questions leave room for differing, though 
not necessarily incompatible, conclusions and perspectives. 
When the UNTAC mission ended in 1993, the general sentiment among long-time observers 
of the Cambodian scene was one of relief and qualified success, notwithstanding the fact that 
key provisions of the Paris Peace Agreements were never implemented. A ceasefire had not 
been secured and, consequently, no disarmament and demobilisation exercise was 
undertaken. Fighting within the country lasted until 1998 when the Khmer Rouge rebellion 
finally ended. Since then, the ruling Cambodian’s People’s Party under Prime Minister Hun 
Sen has been consolidating its grip on power, falling back on authoritarian habits and violent 
practices, all very different from the ‘system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism’ 
envisaged in the Paris Agreements. And yet, Cambodia’s developments since 1991 must 
surely also be viewed against the backdrop of its turbulent, conflict-strewn and exceptionally 
bloody past, including the genocidal rule of the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979, as 
well as the absence of any tradition of liberal, participatory and democratic politics on which 
to draw. Viewed in this light, the central achievement of peace is real enough, even though a 
wider peace dividend has proved elusive.  
In Mozambique, the UN, anxious to avoid a repeat of the catastrophic collapse of the Bicesse 
Accord in Angola, successfully monitored and verified the implementation of the Rome 
Agreement, including the demobilisation of some 80,000 soldiers, the creation of new joint 
army and the organisation of free and fair elections. Since then, four more presidential and 
parliamentary elections have been held. Over the same period, however, economic growth 
has utterly failed to generate wider, more inclusive, socio-economic benefits.  
The case of El Salvador is widely treated as a success story in the peace building literature, 
and there is no denying the gains made as a result of the Chapultepec Peace Agreement of 
1992. Chief among these has been the high degree of political stability brought to the centre 
of national politics. Since the end of the war, the FMLN, having successfully transformed 
itself from a guerrilla force into a political party, and ARENA, the right-wing National 
Republican Alliance formed in 1981, have been contesting elections at regular intervals. 
Crucially, both parties have accepted their legitimacy and abided by their outcome. For all 
this, profound structural inequalities and entrenched power structures persist in El Salvador, 
as they do in Guatemala and Colombia.  
 40 
 
We are back, full circle it would seem, to the wisdom of Oscar Aria’s counter-intuitive 
insistence on peace as having ‘no finishing line, no final deadline, no fixed definition of 
achievement’.  
 
 
 
 
